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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the increasing involvement of countries in the process of produc-
tion fragmentation has contributed to a strong internationalisation of production, 
which means that the final product supplied to the customer is composed of the 
value added of goods and services from a number of countries. As a result, there 
has also been a fundamental change in the role of countries in the international di-
vision of labour. At present, countries specialise in particular stages of production 
rather than in the manufacture of specific goods. It leads to increased interrela-
tions between individual economies. In addition, the phenomenon of production 
fragmentation causes changes in international trade, i.e. a greater importance of 
trade in tasks, building supply chains and the related buoyant growth in trade in 
semi-finished goods (Baldwin – Robert-Nicoud 2014). 
Since the early 1990s, the majority of the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries (CEECs) have been actively involved in the processes of production frag-
mentation, becoming destinations for foreign capital in the form of foreign direct 
investment. The phenomenon triggered major changes in the foreign trade of the 
countries concerned (Havlik 2014; Kawecka-Wyrzykowska et al. 2017). Trade 
in intermediates gained in importance, the share of domestic value added content 
of exports declined and trade values were overstated due to the multiple calcula-
tions in trade statistics of goods at different production stages. Despite a number 
of differences between the CEECs, they had shared a common characteristic of 
having Germany as the main trading partner. During 1995–2011 in five Central 
European countries (CECs), i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia, Germany was the largest recipient of goods and services from those 
countries, as well as the largest supplier to those markets. Germany played a 
slightly lesser role in the trade of Bulgaria and Romania. In addition to Russia and 
Italy in Romania, as well as to Russia and Turkey in Bulgaria, Germany ranked 
among the most important trading partners of those countries. Germany’s share in 
trade was the lowest for the Baltic States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They 
still had strong trade linkages with Russia as well as with Poland (Lithuania), 
Finland (Estonia) and Lithuania (Latvia).
The concept of a value added chain is understood as the full range of econom-
ic activities constituting subsequent stages of manufacturing a product (OECD 
2013). Those include pre-production (research and development, design), pro-
duction and post-production phases (distribution, logistics, marketing and after-
sales services, e.g. servicing and repairs). Specific tasks tend to be undertaken by 
various businesses (branches of a business), located in a number of countries. The 
concept of global value chains (GVCs) refers to value added chains where par-
ticular stages of manufacturing a product are distributed across many countries. 
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Studies are mostly concerned about the participation of the USA, the euro area 
countries, Japan and China in GVCs. Fewer investigations addressed the partici-
pation of Central and Eastern European countries. Olczyk – Kordalska (2017: 92) 
discovered that “the degree of participation in GVCs is surprisingly greater among 
CEE than in other EU countries (i.e. 62.4% for the Czech Republic, 56.6% for 
Hungary, 50.2% for Lithuania, 49.5% for Germany, 45.9% for France).” Grodzicki 
(2014) emphasises that even among the CEECs there were distinct differences in 
involvement in GVCs. “Small countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slo-
vakia – are to a much higher extent dependent on global supply and demand than 
Poland” (Grodzicki 2014: 30). Hagemejer – Ghodsi (2017) analysed the position 
of the new EU Member States in the GVCs in the period of 1995–2011 and con-
cluded “While the world production has become increasingly fragmented and on 
average more upstream, the NMS economies have moved against this trend to 
become relatively closer to the final consumer” (Hagemejer – Ghodsi 2017: 14). 
Folfas (2016) compared the world and Poland’s gross trade and trade in value add-
ed. A review of the literature revealed the lack of a study to comprehensively dis-
cuss issues related to the participation of Germany in the GVCs of the CEECs. 
Thus, this paper aims to present the role of Germany in the GVCs of 10 CEECs 
in 1995–2011. The study covers five CECs, the three Baltic States (Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia) as well as Bulgaria and Romania. The illustration of the 
position of Germany in GVC is based on trade statistics in value added terms 
covering trade in value added as well as the share of value added in trade. 
I put the following research questions in this study:
•  Why is the concept of measuring trade in value added terms important?
•  To what extent do individual CEECs participate in GVCs and what are the 
reasons for such differences? 
•  What are the reasons for a different position of Germany in the GVCs of the 
CEECs?
•  What is the role of FDI in the participation of the CEECs in GVCs?
•  Why do geographical patterns of the CEECs’ gross trade and the CEECs’ 
value added trade with Germany differ?
The starting point of this paper is the presentation of selected aspects relating 
to trade statistics in value added terms. It is followed by a description of the re-
search method. Further, the paper discusses the analysis results, in particular: the 
participation of the CEECs in GVCs; Germany’s backward and forward linkages 
in the value chains of the CEECs; the importance of Germany as a trading partner 
of the CEECs according to statistics in gross and value added terms; bilateral 
trade balances with Germany in accordance with the two approaches and the de-
composition of bilateral exports and imports between the CEECs and Germany. 
The paper concludes in the recapitulation of the main findings from the study.
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2. MEASURING GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: 
TRADE IN VALUE ADDED AND VALUE ADDED IN TRADE
The literature distinguishes between two main concepts connected with the flow 
of value added between countries (Stehrer 2012, 2013; Nagengast – Stehrer 2014). 
One of them, ‘trade in value added’, allows determining how much of the value 
added created in a country is absorbed or consumed in another country. Value 
added may flow to the destination country directly in the form of final product 
or indirectly in the form of a semi-finished product through other countries. It 
means that the country concerned exports an intermediate product to a country in 
which it is used for the manufacture of the final product, subsequently exported to 
the country of destination where it is consumed or absorbed (Johnson – Noguera 
2012). In addition to value added exports, there are also value added imports, 
which allow specifying the origin of the value added consumed or absorbed in 
the importing country. 
The concept related to value added flows between countries also enables the 
calculation of trade balance in value added terms. Although with regard to the 
overall trade of a country the trade balances in gross terms and in value added 
terms are the same, they differ in bilateral trade. Trade statistics in value added 
exclude trade in intermediate goods which are exported to other countries after 
processing or assembly (Koopman et al. 2014). Therefore, this leads to divergent 
statistics according to the two concepts. In the literature, it is emphasised that 
trade flows in value added terms reflect the benefits derived by particular coun-
tries from trade in respect of income and employment well (Foster-McGregor – 
Stehrer 2013; Timmer et al. 2013). 
In order to demonstrate the differences between bilateral trade balances in 
gross terms and in value added terms, Figure 1 presents an example of trade be-
tween three countries. The trade balance in gross terms between countries 3 and 
2 was USD 4. However, trade between the two countries also comprises value 
added from country 1, worth USD 1 (an intermediate product embodied in the 
final product manufactured by country 3). Thus, the trade balance in value added 
terms between country 3 and country 2 amounted to USD 3 since exports from 
country 3 to country 2 contained foreign value added worth USD 1. 
The other concept connected with value added flows between countries is 
‘value added in trade’. It allows identifying the origin of the value added con-
tained in the total foreign trade of a country or in bilateral trade – between two 
countries. It enables the decomposition of exports of one country to another (or of 
the total exports of a country) by origin of the value added embodied in those ex-
ports. Koopman et al. (2010) distinguished between the following components of 
bilateral exports: 1) domestic value added content of exports in the form of final 
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goods absorbed or consumed by the direct importer, 2) domestic value added 
content of exports of intermediates used by the direct importer to produce final 
goods for the domestic market, 3) domestic value added content of exports of 
intermediates used by the direct importer to produce goods for export – indirect 
value added exports, 4) domestic value added content of exports of intermediates 
used by the direct importer to produce goods returned to the country of origin 
of intermediate goods (reflected domestic value added), 5) foreign value added 
content of exports. At the same time, imports from one country to another can 
be decomposed into the following: a) value added created in the country of the 
importer contained in both final and intermediate goods (direct value added im-
ports), b) re-imports – value added created in the importing country and exported 
to the country of the importer for its production needs, subsequently brought to 
the importing country, c) value added content of the imports of a given country 
created in a country other than the country of the importer (Stehrer et al. 2012).
Statistics on value added in trade also served to determine the participation of 
the CEECs in GVCs (for more on this subject see Section 3).
To sum up, the concept of value added in trade refers to trade flows in gross 
terms, enabling to decompose them by origin of value added. The notion of trade 
in value added is not directly related to trade flows in gross terms. Whereas tra-
ditional trade statistics include the value of specific products in circulation in the 
world economy, trade in value added is somewhat an ‘abstract’ concept. Statistics 
on trade in value added terms register the flow of value added across countries. 
This value is frequently not the same as that of products moved as those comprise 
components manufactured in various countries. 
Figure 1. Diagram of trade between three countries
Note: The gross trade balance between countries 1 and 2 is USD 1, that between country 1 and country 3 – USD 
1, whereas that between country 3 and country 2 – USD 4. Trade balance in value added terms will differ from 
gross trade balance on account of trade in intermediate goods, amounting to USD 2 between countries 1 and 2, 
USD 0 between countries 1 and 3, USD 3 between countries 3 and 2. 
Source: Nagengast – Stehrer (2014).
6 ŁUKASZ AMBROZIAK
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
Based on an input-output approach, the well-known fundamental equation is 
(Stehrer 2013):
 x = Ax + f, (1)
where:
x denotes the CG × 1 vector of gross output (where C denotes the number of 
countries and G is the number of sectors considered),
A = , , 1,...,, , 1,...,[ ]
r s r s C
i j i j Ga

 denotes the CG× CG matrix of technical input-output coeffi-
cients (costs) with each element representing the input used in a particular indus-
try in one country per unit of gross output, 
f denotes the CG × 1 vector of final output.
Transformations result in the equation referred to the Leontief model: 
 (I – A)x = f, (2)
where:
(I – A) denotes the Leontief matrix transforming the vector of gross output x into 
the vector of final output f,
and subsequently in the following equation: 
 x = (I – A)–1f = Lf, (3)
where:
(I – A)–1 = L denotes the matrix of material-intensity (or additional demand) coef-
ficients, also referred to as the Leontief inverse. 
For three countries and using partitioned matrices, the equations can be written 
as follows:
  (4)
3.1. Indicator of participation in GVCs
In order to calculate the participation rate of a country in GVCs, the value added 
trade flow matrix T was used, in the following form (Stehrer 2013): 
 T = vLt, (5)
where:
1 11 12 13 1 1 11 12 13 11 12 13
2 21 22 23 2 2 21 22 23 21 22 23
3 31 32 33 3 3 31 32 33 31 32 33
x A A A x f L L L f f f
x A A A x f L L L f f f
x A A A x f L L L f f f
                                               
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v denotes the 1 × CG vector of value added coefficients, i.e., value added created 
per unit of gross output, 
t denotes the CG×1 vector of exports of individual countries by sectors. 
For three countries and one industry, the matrix of value added flows T formu-
lated in equation (6) is as follows1:
  
(6)
This matrix allows to assess both the origin of the value added contained in 
the exports of each country (and industry) and the distribution of the value added 
across countries. In order to determine the composition of exports by country of 
the origin of value added, we need to look at the columns of the above matrix, 
whereas the directions of the distribution of value added in exports of destination 
countries are shown in the rows. Exports are composed of domestic value added 
and foreign value added.
The first column of matrix T includes elements describing the country of ori-
gin of the value added content of country 1’s exports. For example, v1L11e1* de-
notes the value added created in country 1, subsequently exported by that country 
to foreign markets. In turn, v2L21e1* is the value added created in country 2 and 
contained in the exports of country 1. A similar interpretation concerns v3L31e1*. 
The value of domestic content in exports of individual countries can be seen on 
the diagonal of matrix T (v1L11e1*, v2L22e2*, v3L33e3*). The sum of elements of each 
column is equal to the gross exports of specific countries.
The first row of matrix T (with the exception of v1L11e1*) shows which part 
of the value added exported by country 1 is re-exported by country 2 (v1L12e2*) 
and country 3 (v1L13e3*). In the literature it is referred to as indirect value added 
exports (Koopman et al. 2010). On the global scale, the sum of foreign content 
in exports of particular countries must be equal to the sum of the value added of 
particular countries in third countries’ exports (i.e. to the sum of indirect value 
added exports).
The determination of the position of individual countries in GVCs was based 
on the GVC participation rate. It establishes the participation of exports of a 
country in the multi-stage process of creating trade flows by capturing the foreign 
value added content of exports and the domestic value added content of exports 
1  In order to present the matrix T as a square matrix, diagonalisation of vectors v and t was 
needed.
1 11 1* 1 12 2* 1 13 3*
2 21 1* 2 22 2* 2 23 3*
3 31 1* 3 32 2* 3 33 3*
v L e v L e v L e
T v L e v L e v L e
v L e v L e v L e
      
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of the destination countries. (Koopman et al. 2010). The GVC participation rate 
can be expressed as follows:
  (7),
where:
FVA – foreign value added in exports of a country,
DVX – indirect domestic value added exports of a country,
DVA – domestic value added exports of a country absorbed by direct partner.
The indicator in question is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the foreign 
value added (FVA) content of exports of a country and the indirect value added 
(DVX) exports to the value of gross exports of that country (FVA + DVA + DVA). 
The first element of the sum, i.e. the foreign value added embodied in exports, 
determines the nature of backward linkages of a country in the production chain, 
whereas the second one, i.e. domestic value added embodied as intermediate in-
puts in third countries’ exports, shows forward linkages in the production chain 
(UNCTAD 2013).
3.2. Value added in bilateral trade
In order to decompose the bilateral trade flows according to the origin of value 
added, let us begin with equation (5), where t denotes the CG×1 vector of bilat-
eral trade between two countries. 
Using three countries and one sector approach, the vector of bilateral trade 
between country 1 and country 2 is as follows: 
12
21
0
e
t e
      
. Note that exports of 
country 2 to country 1 equal to imports of country 1 from country 22. The square 
matrix of value added flows between country 1 and country 2 is as follows (Stehrer 
2013): 
  (8)
2  In contrast to traditional trade statistics, trade data on flows of goods and services from 
the world input-output table are characterised by the lack of differences in mirror statistics 
(Timmer et al. 2015).
FVA DVX FVA DVXGVC
FVA DVX DVA FVA DVX DVA FVA DVX DVA
       
1 11 12 1 12 21
2 21 12 2 22 21
3 31 12 3 32 21
0
0
0
v L e v L e
T v L e v L e
v L e v L e
      
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The first column contains elements describing the country of origin of value 
added in exports of country 1 to country 2. For example, element v1L11e12 denotes 
the value added created in country 1, subsequently exported to country 2 (the 
so-called direct exports). Element v2L21e12 is the value added generated in country 
2, exported by country 2 to country 1 and subsequently embodied in exports of 
country 1 to country 2 (the so-called re-export). In turn, element v3L31e12 denotes 
the value added created in country 3 and embodied in exports of country 1 to 
country 2.. The sum of the elements from the first column is equal to gross exports 
from country 1 to country 2. It is also important to determine the part of the value 
added created in country 1 and shipped to country 2 through other countries. To 
this end, the input-output table of value added flows in exports and imports of 
country 2 is calculated.
The second column of the matrix contains elements describing the country of 
origin of the value added content of imports of country 1 from country 2. For exam-
ple, element –v2L22e21 denotes the value added created in country 2, subsequently 
brought to country 1 (the so-called direct imports). Element – v1L12e21 denotes the 
value added created in country 1, subsequently exported to country 2 as inputs to 
its export-oriented production and then again brought to country 1 (the so-called 
re-imports). In turn, element – v3L32e21 denotes the value added created in country 
3 and embodied in imports of country 1 from country 2. The value added created 
in country 2 may be also shipped to country 1 through other countries. To this 
end, the input-output table of value added flows in exports and imports of country 
1 is calculated.
3.3. Trade in value added
For the purpose of estimating trade in value added of the countries under analysis, 
in equation (5) vector t (the trade flow vector) was replaced with the vector of 
final demand f. Equation (5) is then expressed in equations (9) and (10) as fol-
lows: 
 VAX = vLf  (9)
or
 VAM = vLf,  (10) 
where:
VAX denotes the matrix of value added exports, VAM denotes the matrix of value 
added imports and f denotes the CG×1 vector of final demand.
The value added exports of country 1 to country 2 are computed according to 
equation (11):
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(11).
The first element of the last equation denotes the value added created in coun-
try 1 and exported in the form of final goods to country 2. The second element 
refers to the value added created in country 1 and exported as intermediates to 
country 2, to be consumed or absorbed after further processing. The third element 
denotes the value added of country 1 and exported as intermediates to country 3, 
to be shipped after processing as final goods to country 2. 
The calculation of the value added imports of country 1 from country 2 will be 
based on the equation to estimate the value added exports of country 2 to country 1:
  
  
(12).
The first element of the equation (12) is the value added created in country 
2 and exported as intermediate goods to country 1, where it is absorbed or con-
sumed after further processing. The second element denotes the value added cre-
ated in country 2 and shipped as final goods to country 1. The third element is the 
value added created in country 2, shipped in the form of intermediates to country 
3 for its processing, and subsequently sent as the final product to country 1.
Therefore, trade balance between country 1 and country 2 in value added terms 
can be computed according to the following formula in equation (13):
12 1 11 12 1 12 22 1 13 32 2 21 11 2 22 21 2 23 31( ) ( )NVAX v L f v L f v L f v L f v L f v L f       (13).
Trade statistics in value added terms were calculated on the basis of data from 
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD Release 2013)3. 
3  The database contains a set of international supply and use tables and world input-output 
tables by industry. The WIOD Release 2013 covers 40 countries, including 27 EU Member 
States and 13 other major economies such as: the USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, China, India, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Turkey, Indonesia and Russia. The database includes 
data for the period from 1995 to 2011 (17 years), for 35 sectors by 59 products (supply and use 
tables) and for 35 sectors by 35 sectors (input-output tables) (Timmer et al. 2015).
11 12 13 12
12 1 21 22 23 22 1 11 12 1 12 22 1 13 32
31 32 33 32
( 0 0)
L L L f
VAX v L L L f v L f v L f v L f
L L L f
                  
11 12 13 11
12 21 2 21 22 23 21 2 21 11 2 22 21 2 23 31
31 32 33 31
(0 0)
L L L f
VAM VAX v L L L f v L f v L f v L f
L L L f
                   
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1. CEECs in global value chains 
Economies participating in GVCs can both use intermediates for their export 
production and supply them to satisfy the production and the export needs of third 
countries (export destinations). In order to assess the involvement of particular 
countries in the world system of production and trade, the rate of participation in 
GVCs was used. It allows to evaluate the nature of both backward linkages and 
forward linkages in the production chain. 
The GVC participation rate is very useful in the determination of the degree 
to which exports of a country are integrated into the world production system. 
A high degree of participation in GVCs allows a country to derive additional 
benefits from trade, but there are also certain risks involved. Additional benefits 
will primarily arise from making a better use of their comparative advantages by 
specific countries (OECD 2013). The production process is divided into many 
stages which can be located in accordance with the distribution of comparative 
advantages among countries. At the same time, a high degree of integration of 
exports into the world production system makes them very sensitive to cyclical 
movements. In periods of economic slowdown/collapse, such countries experi-
ence relatively the most abrupt fall in exports, which further aggravates crisis 
phenomena in the economy (Gereffi – Luo 2015). 
Among the CEECs, in 2011 the highest participation in the global system of 
production and trade characterised the CECs, in particular the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia. Their GVC participation rates exceeded 65% (Figure 2). 
The rates for Poland and Slovenia were lower, at nearly 60%. The lowest GVC 
participation rates were noted in exports of Romania and Latvia (below 50%). As 
regards the other three countries, their rates were around 55%. Different partici-
pation of the CEECs in GVCs can be explained as follows. The highest partici-
pation in GVCs characterised the countries with relatively smaller economies. 
According to Vlcková (2015), “Small economies, in general, source more inputs 
from abroad”. However, a small economy is not necessarily highly integrated 
into the GVCs. The most important factor seems to be the inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Since the 1990s, the CECs (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slo-
vakia, Hungary and Slovenia) were the locations for investment projects mainly 
aimed at improving business efficiency by minimising the production costs – the 
so-called efficiency-seeking investment (Miškinis – Reinbold 2010; Ambroziak 
2012b). It was primarily greenfield investment (rather than brownfield invest-
ment aimed at restructuring), mostly made by EU Member States, consisting the 
building ‘from scratch’ of a production plant in the host country. The factors 
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shaping FDI inflow to the CECs include a rather good level of transport and 
communication infrastructure, the availability of relatively cheap (in comparison 
with the EU-15 countries) and skilled workforce, the proximity to suppliers and 
outlets, and the intensified economic cooperation with the EU Member States 
during the 1990s as well as prospects of future EU membership of those countries 
(Ambroziak 2012a). To a lesser degree, the CECs were also investment destina-
tions for Asian and US corporations. However, unlike European enterprises, they 
were mostly motivated by the desire to evade tariff barriers and maintain previous 
export markets – the so-called tariff jumping investment (Kaliszuk 2016). For 
Asian and US firms, the CECs were “a gateway to more developed markets in the 
EU” (Cieślik et al. 2016). 
The main destinations for foreign investment in the CECs were primarily la-
bour-intensive manufacturing industries, e.g. the manufacture of transport equip-
ment and of certain mechanical and electric machinery and equipment (Soós 
2015). The above-mentioned industries are characterised by a low share of do-
mestic value added in exports, which translates into the overall share of domestic 
value added in exports of these countries. Poland was also actively involved in 
the process of production fragmentation, but due to its larger economy (in com-
parison with the other countries in the region), thus a greater internal market and 
Figure 2. Participation of the CEECs in global value chains, % of gross exports
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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lesser importance to foreign trade, its GVC participation rates were lower com-
pared to other CECs (Grodzicki 2014).
The comparison of the two components of GVC participation rate suggests 
that the participation of CEECs in GVCs has varied during 2011. A high domes-
tic value added content of exports of third countries/export destinations (DVX) 
indicates stronger forward linkages in the value added chain. It means that the 
country concerned is at an early stage of that chain. At the same time, a high 
foreign value added (FVA) content of exports shows stronger backward linkages 
in the value added chain. It indicates the position of the country concerned at the 
final stage of the chain. 
Figure 3 presents the foreign value added content of gross exports of particular 
CEECs (the horizontal axis) and the domestic value added content of third coun-
tries’ exports in gross exports of the CEECs (the vertical axis) in 2011. The axes 
of the coordinate system intersect at the points representing the average FVA and 
DVX values for the EU as a whole. It allows to divide the chart area into four 
fields. Field A includes countries showing strong backward as well as forward 
linkages in the production chain (FVA and DVX above the average). Among the 
CEECs those were Slovakia and to a lesser degree, Poland and Estonia. Field B 
shows countries with a major FVA content of exports (above-average FVA), play-
ing a relatively minor role as suppliers of intermediate goods for the production 
Figure 3. FVA and DVX rates in the exports of the CEECs, 2011, % of gross exports
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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and exports of third countries (low DVX values). The group comprised Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, and to a lesser degree, Lithuania and Bulgaria. It allows 
to suppose that the above-mentioned countries were closer to the end rather than 
to the beginning of the value chain in 2011. The above-average FVA content of 
exports also characterised Slovenia, but its downward linkages in the production 
chain were at the EU average. As regards field C, it contains countries which 
show strong forward linkages (DVX above the average) and weak backward link-
ages (FVA below the average) in the production chain. The group included Ro-
mania and Latvia. In field D (weak backward and forward linkages in the value 
chain) there were no CEECs. 
During 1995–2011, some CEECs actively participated in GVCs. Exports of the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, and to a lesser degree of Slovakia, showed 
a marked rise in the foreign value added content (by ca. 16–17 percentage points 
– pp – in 1995–2011), whereas the importance of those countries as exporters 
of intermediate goods for the production and exports of third countries (forward 
linkages) increased to a limited degree. It means that the above-mentioned coun-
tries moved towards the end of the global value chain. As regards Slovenia, Bul-
garia and Romania, and to a lesser degree Lithuania, the group clearly strength-
ened their forward linkages in the value chain, with limited growth in the FVA 
content of exports. Therefore, these countries moved towards the beginning of 
the GVC, increasing their foreign sales of intermediate goods for export-oriented 
production of third countries.
In the literature, it is stressed that countries integrated into GVCs are particu-
larly exposed to fluctuations in world demand. It also concerned the majority 
of the CEECs as the financial and economic crisis during 2008/2009 distinctly 
weakened their downward linkages and, to a lesser extent, their forward link-
ages in the GVCs. During the crisis, the FVA content of the CEECs’ exports 
dropped more abruptly than the domestic value added content. The reason was 
that the industries with highly internationalised production processes represent-
ing important sectors in the majority of the CEECs, were hit the most by the 
economic crisis. Such industries produce durable goods (such as cars, house-
hold appliances, radio and television equipment) characterised by relatively 
elastic demand. Consequently, there was a marked decrease in flows of trade 
in intermediates and final products manufactured in these industries (Stehrer – 
Stöllinger 2013). 
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4.2. Backward and forward linkages of the CEECs with Germany 
The role of Germany as a supplier of the FVA content of exports of the CEECs 
(backward linkages) as well as the share of Germany in indirect value added ex-
ports of those countries (forward linkages) varied widely. In the Central European 
countries and Romania, Germany was the largest supplier of intermediates for 
export-oriented production of those countries (Figure 4). In 2011 German value 
added accounted for nearly 11% and 9% of Czech and Hungarian exports, re-
spectively. In Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia that share was around 7%, whereas 
it was 4% in Romania. In other CEECs the figure did not exceed 3%. During 
1995–2011, there was a rise in the German value added content of gross exports 
only in the case of the CECs (with the exception of Slovenia). 
The differences among the CEECs in their backward linkages (and also for-
ward linkages) with Germany can be explained by different trade and investment 
interdependencies between the economies of the CEECs on the one hand and 
the German economy on the other hand. The geographical proximity, cultural 
similarity, relatively low labour costs and skilled workforce encouraged Ger-
many to relocate some of its production to the CEECs, especially to the CECs 
(IMF 2013). Moreover, Miškinis – Reinbold (2010) emphasise the role of state 
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policies towards foreign investors. German investments were targeted mainly at 
few sectors, namely automotive, electronic/electrical, chemical and machinery 
industries. As a result, Germany became a major foreign direct investor in most 
of the CEECs. The majority of German FDI was located in Poland, in Hungary 
and in the Czech Republic, these countries received as much as 78% of foreign 
capital inflows of all the CEECs. Although Poland hosted the most German FDI, 
it played a greater role in the economies of Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
German inward FDI accounted for 8% of Czech’s GDP and for as much as 15.6% 
of Hungary’s GDP. 
The most significant investment by German corporations was attracted by 
the automotive industry in Central Europe (Túry 2014; Krzywdzinski 2008). 
Volkswagen invested in vehicle assembly plants in Poland (passenger cars, vans, 
lorries and MAN buses), the Czech Republic (Škoda), Slovakia and Hungary 
(Audi) and also in engine factories in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland 
(Túry 2016). Investment projects in Hungary also included a Mercedes car pro-
duction plant of Daimler and an engine factory owned by Opel. In Poland, Opel 
invested in both a car factory and in an engine production plant.
The forward linkages of the CEECs with Germany in the value added chain 
were weaker than their backward linkages. With the exception of Estonia, how-
ever, Germany was the most important exporter of the value added created in 
the CEECs. The largest share characterised the CECs, particularly Poland. In 
2011 nearly 28% of the Polish value added embodied in other countries’ exports 
Table 1. German inward FDI in the CEECs at the end of 2015
Country Value, EUR million 
Place of 
Germany 
among 
foreign 
investors
Share in 
inward FDI 
from the EU, 
%
Share in total 
inward FDI, 
%
Share in 
GDP, %
Bulgaria 2,518.5 3. 8.7 6.6 5.6
Czech Republic* 12,599.5 3. 14.5 12.6 8.0
Estonia 250.4 15. 1.8 1.4 1.2
Hungary 17,157.8 2. 25.8 22.4 15.6
Latvia 719.7 7. 7.2 5.3 3.0
Lithuania 1,246.5 3. 11.2 9.2 3.3
Poland 27,356.0 2. 17.8 16.4 6.4
Romania 7,990.0 3. 13.8 12.4 5.0
Slovakia 2,546.1 7. 7.0 6.3 3.2
Slovenia 1,083.1 3. 11.1 9.4 2.8
Note: * Data for the Czech Republic refers to 2014.
Source: Own calculation on the basis of WIIW Foreign Direct Investment Database.
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was exported by Germany. The value of such exports accounted for over 7% 
of Poland’s gross exports. In the case of other CECs, the share was around 6%. 
It means that some of these countries’ exports to Germany were hinged on the 
demand for German products in foreign markets. For instance, a potential fall 
in Chinese demand for German vehicles would push down German imports of 
automotive parts and components from Poland. 
4.3. Trade in value added of the CEECs: The role of Germany 
In 2011 the share of Germany in exports of all the CEECs was lower in value add-
ed terms compared to gross exports. The most significant differences concerned 
the CECs. The share of Germany in value added exports of the Czech Republic 
was 10 percentage points lower than its share in Czech gross exports (Figure 5). 
In 2011 slightly more than 19% of Czech value added exported to other countries 
was absorbed or consumed in Germany. The share of Germany in value added ex-
ports of the other four CECs was 6 to 8 pps lower than that of their gross exports. 
It was 17% in Poland and 14% in Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia each. 
The differences in the share of Germany in value added exports and gross ex-
ports of the CECs can be explained by the strong position of Germany in the glo-
bal value chains of these countries. Due to the major importance of intermediate 
goods in exports of the CECs to Germany, exports to Germany were ‘overstated’ 
according to traditional statistics. Intermediates were used by German enterprises 
to produce final goods, often intended for export. Therefore, some of the value 
added from the CECs exported to Germany was then consumed or absorbed in 
other countries. The comparison of the geographical composition of the CECs in 
gross terms and in value added terms implies that the shares of countries such as 
the United States, China and Japan were higher according to value added statistics 
than according to traditional statistics4. Hence, Germany was a major exporter of 
the value added created in the CECs to the above-mentioned non-EU markets. 
Among other CEECs, Germany played the greatest role in Romanian exports. 
In 2011 around 10% of Romanian value added exports to other countries was ab-
sorbed or consumed in Germany. The difference of 3.1 pps between the share of 
Germany in Romanian gross exports and that in value added exports thus points 
to the major importance of Germany in the Romanian value added chains. In Bul-
garia and in the Baltic States the differences in the share of Germany, computed 
on the basis of value added and gross statistics, did not exceed 2 pps, whereas the 
share of Germany did not exceed 10%. The lesser role of Germany in the trade 
4 The same findings for Poland were obtained by Folfas (2016).
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of the Baltic States primarily stemmed from the greater geographic distance and 
traditional links between these countries concerned and other countries from the 
Baltic Sea region, e.g. Sweden and Finland. 
The differences in the share of Germany in imports of the CEECs, calculated 
on the basis of trade statistics in gross and value added terms were lower than 
differences in their exports. With the exception of Bulgaria and the Baltic States, 
in 2011 the share of Germany in value added imports was – as in value added ex-
ports – lower than in gross imports. The greatest gaps are observed in the Czech 
Republic (6 pps), Poland (5 pps) and Hungary (4 pps). It indicates that the coun-
tries concerned are not only sub-suppliers of parts and components to German 
enterprises, but they also import German value added in the form of intermedi-
ate goods. After appropriate processing or assembly, such intermediates are then 
exported to other countries. Therefore, some of the German value added, em-
bodied in imports of the CECs are not consumed or absorbed in those countries, 
hence the relatively lesser importance of Germany in their imports in value added 
terms. In 2011 slightly more than 20% of the value added originated abroad and 
absorbed or consumed in the Czech Republic had come from Germany. For Hun-
gary it was 19%, whereas the figure for Poland was slightly more than 17%. In 
Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria around 15% and in the Baltic States 
only around 10% of the value added originated abroad consumed or absorbed in 
those countries had come from Germany. 
Figure 5. Share of Germany in trade of goods and services in the CEECs, 2011, %
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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The large differences between geographical patterns of the CECs’ gross trade 
and the CECs’ value added trade with Germany may be explained by the dis-
aggregation of value added trade by industries (Figure 6). In these countries, 
the dissimilarities resulted from a major share in the gross exports of medium-
high- and high-technology products, manufactured in industries characterised by 
significantly internationalised production (mainly the manufacture of transport 
equipment, of electrical and optical equipment and of machinery). The propor-
tion of the products concerned in the value added exports of the CECs was mark-
edly lower. Stehrer – Stöllinger (2013) explain that trade in intermediates is more 
developed in manufacturing than in services. The specific characteristics of the 
manufacture of goods allow to divide the process into a number of stages, fre-
quently distributed across different countries. It creates flows of foreign trade in 
semi-finished products between the countries in which specific production stages 
are located. The most extreme examples are the medium- and medium-high-
technology industries. A higher share in the value added exports of the CECs was 
noted in the case of services, particularly non-tradable services (mostly the sale, 
Figure 6. Gross (X) and value added (VAX) exports of the CEECs by sectors, 2011, %
Notes: Medium-high- and high-tech goods: chemicals and chemical products, machinery, electrical and optical 
equipment, transport equipment. Non-tradable market services: sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles, wholesale trade and commission trade, retail trade, accommodation and food service activi-
ties, real estate activities. Non-processed goods: products of agriculture, mining and quarrying. Other processed 
goods: other processed goods than medium-high- and high-tech goods. Other services: other services than non-
tradable market services. 
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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maintenance and repair of motor vehicles as well as wholesale and retail trade) 
and business services. Services contribute significantly to the process of the man-
ufacture of goods, e.g. design, transport, distribution, etc. Trade statistics in gross 
terms recognise that part of value added as exports of goods which results in the 
understatement of the actual role of services in international trade.
At the level of total trade, the trade balances of a country in value added terms 
and in gross terms are equal. However, significant differences can be seen in 
bilateral trade. The phenomenon was also observed, to a varying degree, in the 
trade of the CEECs with Germany. The greatest differences between the trade 
balance in gross terms and that in value added terms were observed in the CECs. 
The value of the trade balance computed on the basis of traditional statistics was 
clearly higher than the trade balance calculated on the basis of value added sta-
tistics (Figures 7 to 9). According to traditional trade statistics, in 2011 the Czech 
Republic recorded a surplus of USD 8.7 billion in trade of goods and services 
with Germany. In value added terms, the surplus was less than one-fourth of the 
figure, at USD 2.1 billion. A similar situation concerned Slovakia and Slovenia 
– the trade surplus in value added terms was markedly smaller than the surplus 
in gross trade. Poland and Hungary achieved positive trade balances with Ger-
many according to traditional statistics, whereas they recorded deficits in value 
added terms. Foster-McGregor – Stehrer (2013) emphasise that the value added 
Figure 7. Trade balance of the CEECs with Germany in gross and value added terms, 2011, USD 
million
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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Figure 8. Trade balance of the CECs with Germany in gross and value added terms, 1995–2011, 
USD million
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
Figure 9. Trade balance of the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania with Germany in gross and 
value added terms, 1995–2011, USD million
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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measures of bilateral trade provide better estimates of which countries benefit 
from trade in terms of income and employment. Trade balance in value added 
terms only takes account of the value added of the country concerned consumed 
or absorbed in Germany and of the German value added consumed or absorbed 
in that country. At the same time, it excludes trade in intermediate goods which 
are exported to other countries after processing or assembly. 
According to Nagengast – Stehrer (2016), differences between bilateral trade 
balances in gross and value added terms are mostly determined by two factors: 
FVA consumed by the respective trading partner and demand in third countries 
other than the two trade partners. In 2011, 88% of gross trade surplus of the 
Czech Republic with Germany resulted from the FVA embodied in Czech exports 
and consumed in Germany. The FVA content of Czech exports to Germany was 
USD 7.6 billion higher than the FVA content of Czech imports from Germany. 
The decomposition of gross trade balance by value added content revealed that 
the final demand from third countries (mainly China, the USA, France and Aus-
tria) explained as much as 68% of gross surplus in Poland’s trade with Germany 
(Ambroziak 2017). Considering the structure of trade by industry, the distinct 
differences in trade balances of the CECs with Germany calculated in accordance 
with the two approaches were attributable to products of medium-high- and high-
technology industries (e.g. the manufacture of transport, electrical and optical 
equipment). 
4.4. Bilateral trade of the CEECs with Germany in value added terms 
The use of trade statistics in value added terms allows to estimate the sources of 
value added in gross exports of the CEECs to Germany and the origin of value 
added in imports of these countries from Germany. During 1995–2011 the domes-
tic value added content of exports of the CEECs (with the exception of Estonia ) 
to Germany (the so-called direct exports) showed a decrease (Figure 10). The 
most abrupt decline in exports of the CECs were evident particularly in Hungar-
ian exports (with a fall in the share by 20 pps in 1995–2011) as well as in Poland 
and the Czech Republic (a drop by 19 pps). In Slovakia and Slovenia, the impor-
tance of direct exports decreased by 11 pps and 7 pps, respectively. In 2011 the 
most domestic value added was contained in Romanian and Latvian exports to 
Germany – around 70% of the gross exports. The smallest domestic value added 
content of exports to the German market were by Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic (slightly below half of gross exports), behind Slovakia and Slovenia (55% and 
59%, respectively). In other countries, the share of direct exports ranged between 
62% and 65%. 
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The fall in the domestic value added content of exports of the CEECs to Ger-
many was accompanied by the increased importance of FVA. That content repre-
sented the German value added supplied in the form of intermediates particularly 
to CEECs for further processing, to be subsequently exported to Germany (the 
so-called re-export) and foreign (other than German) value added. In the period 
covered, there was a rise in the share of re-export in exports to Germany of four 
CECs, i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. In Slovenia that 
share dropped slightly, but it was high throughout the period under analysis. In 
2011 German value added accounted for as much as 12% of the gross exports 
of the Czech Republic and Hungary to Germany. In other CECs the share was 
around 7%–8%. The high proportion of re-export in trade of the CECs with Ger-
many corroborates the thesis on the significant involvement of German busi-
nesses in the production and exports of those countries.
In 1995–2011 the composition of imports of the CEECs from Germany was 
similar in all these countries. In the period covered, the share of German value add-
ed in imports of these countries (the so-called direct imports) dropped by around 
12 to 13 pps. Therefore, there was an increase in the share of FVA (Figure 11). In 
2011 direct imports accounted for slightly more than 70% of gross imports of the 
CEECs from Germany. The importance of re-imports, i.e. value added imports 
from Germany, which were previously created particularly in CEECs, were mar-
ginal. The remaining part of imports of the CEECs from Germany represented 
FVA other than German value added. The dissimilarities in the composition of the 
Figure 10. Bilateral exports of the CEECs to Germany, 1995 and 2011, %
 Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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CEECs’ exports to Germany and of their imports from Germany indicate differ-
ent positions of the CEECs on the one hand and of Germany on the other hand in 
GVCs. Olczyk – Kordalska (2017) showed that the CEECs “do not occupy a fa-
vourable position in GVCs. Probably, they are positioned in the middle part of the 
GVCs”. It means that the economies of the CEECs could be locked into GVCs at 
the bottom of the so-called ‘smile curve’. In turn, Germany rather occupies slopes 
of the so-called ‘smile curves’, quite far from the bottom. The pre-production 
(product concept, design, R&D) and post-production (sales and marketing, after-
sales services) stages create relatively considerable value added. 
Olczyk – Kordalska (2017) discovered also that during 1995–2011 the CEECs 
“were not able to go up into the higher stages of GVCs in which more value is 
generated”. However, certain authors note that some sectors, e.g. the automotive 
industry, have already experienced upgrading (Pavlínek et al. 2009; Vlčková et 
al. 2015; Éltető et al. 2015). According to Gereffi – Fernandez-Stark (2011: 12), 
“economic upgrading is defined as firms, countries or regions moving to higher 
value activities in GVCs in order to increase the benefits (e.g. security, profits, 
value-added, capabilities) from participating in global production”. Such a proc-
ess is exemplified by the location of research and development centres in the 
CEECs, switching to higher value added products (e.g. the production of battery 
cells for electric cars) or the placement in new value chains where more value 
added is generated (e.g. the manufacture of electric vehicles). 
Figure 11. Bilateral imports of the CEECs from Germany, 1995 and 2011, %
Source: Own calculations based on WIOD Release 2013 (Timmer et al. 2015).
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On the other hand, Ferrantino – Taglioni (2014) question the benefits of up-
grading within GVCs. Some of the lessons learnt during the financial and eco-
nomic crisis 2008/2009 were confirmed during the recent slowdown in global 
merchandise trade (from 2010 to the early 2013). The authors emphasised that 
“trade in complex products organised in GVCs has once again been more sensi-
tive to global downturns than has trade in simple products, particularly for motor 
vehicles. Although evidence is still accumulating, this suggests that the prefer-
ence often expressed for countries to go ‘up the value chain’ by specialising in 
more and more complex products may need to be qualified.” 
5. CONCLUSIONS
In 2011 the GVC participation rates exceeded 65% for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovakia. The rates for Poland and Slovenia were lower, at nearly 
60%. The lowest GVC participation rates were noted in exports of Romania and 
Lithuania (below 50%). As regards the other three countries, their rates were 
around 55%. 
In 2011, Slovakia and, to a lesser degree, Poland and Estonia had strong back-
ward as well as forward linkages in the production chain. Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and, to a lesser degree, Lithuania had strong backward linkages, where-
as they played minor role as suppliers of intermediate goods for the production 
and exports of third countries. Romania and Latvia showed strong forward link-
ages and weak backward linkages. During the period of 1995–2011 the CECs 
strengthened their backward linkages (share of FVA in their exports), whereas 
the importance of those countries as exporters of intermediate goods for the pro-
duction and exports of third countries (forward linkages) increased to a limited 
degree. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and to a lesser degree Lithuania, clearly 
strengthened their forward linkages in the value chain, with limited growth in the 
FVA content of exports.
The differences among the CEECs in their backward and forward linkages 
with Germany can be explained by different trade and investment interdepend-
encies. Germany was the largest supplier of intermediates for export-oriented 
production of the CECs and Romania. In 2011 German value added accounted 
for nearly 11% and 9% of Czech and Hungarian exports, respectively. In Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia that share was around 7%, whereas it was 4% in Romania. 
In other CEECs the figure did not exceed 3%. The forward linkages of the CEECs 
with Germany in the value added chain were weaker than their backward link-
ages. With the exception of Estonia, however, Germany was the most important 
exporter of the value added created in the CEECs. The largest share characterised 
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the CECs, particularly Poland. In 2011 nearly 28% of the Polish value added em-
bodied in other countries’ exports was exported by Germany. The value of such 
exports accounted for over 7% of Poland’s gross exports. In the case of other 
CECs, the share was around 6%. 
Germany is a major trading partner in most of the CEECs. The share of Ger-
many in the CEECs trade in value added terms and gross terms differs. Also, 
trade balances between these countries and Germany calculated according to the 
two approaches also differ. The greatest differences characterised the CECs. This 
means that these countries are not only important sub-suppliers of parts and com-
ponents to German enterprises, but they also import German value added in the 
form of intermediates. The trade balances between the CECs and Germany meas-
ured in value added terms were clearly lower than in gross terms. This implies 
that the CECs benefited from trade with Germany much less than traditional trade 
statistics indicate. Differences between bilateral trade balances in gross and value 
added terms were mostly determined by two factors: (a) foreign value added 
consumed by the CECs on one hand and Germany on the other (i.e. Czech trade 
with Germany in 2011) and (b) demand in third countries other than the two trade 
partners (i.e. Poland’s trade with Germany in 2011).
In the period covered, there was a rise in the share of re-export in exports to 
Germany of the CEECs. In 2011 German value added accounted for as much as 
12% of the value of gross exports of the Czech Republic and Hungary to Germa-
ny. In other CECs the share was around 7%–8%. The high proportion of re-export 
in trade with Germany corroborates the thesis on the significant involvement of 
German businesses in the production and exports of those countries.
Global value chains have changed since the last year for which data were 
available (2011). In order to answer the question, how those developments have 
influenced the role of Germany in the GVCs of the CEECs, it is necessary to 
conduct further research, e.g. with the use of data from the WIOD Release 2016. 
However, on account of the methodology change, the results obtained on the ba-
sis of data from the WIOD Release 2016 cannot be comparable with the findings 
from analyses based on the WIOD Release 2013. 
It would be worth conducting a more in-depth analysis of the upgrading in the 
GVCs of the CEECs. The following questions remain open: which countries from 
the group under examination have made the greatest progress towards higher 
value activities in GVCs, what economic sectors in the CEECs experience the 
fastest upgrading, how the upgrading process is linked with German FDI inflows 
to the CEECs and what type of upgrading prevails.
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